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PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN THE AGE OF
THE INTERNET OF THINGS
NICOLE SMITH†
“Wake up, baby!”1
Imagine waking up in the middle of the night to the sound of
a stranger speaking to your baby through the baby monitor. For
one Texas couple, this horror story became reality when a man
hacked their internet-connected monitors to watch and stalk
their child.2 In a similarly horrifying scenario, a hacker stalked
Miss Teen USA, Cassidy Wolf, for a year via her webcam.3 The
stalker had 24/7 access to her webcam and also traced the
keystrokes on her keyboard to learn her passwords for various
web accounts.4
Subsequently, the hacker used private
information he learned about her from those accounts to
blackmail her into doing whatever he wanted.5 Unfortunately, as
the amount of technology in use increases, frightening stories
like these become more common. It is not difficult to envision a
scenario in which hackers can gain access to financial
information, medical records, and other critical private
information. In light of ever increasing technological advances,
Congress must respond by enacting legislation that addresses the
specific security and privacy concerns that internet-connected
technology presents.
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS

Definition and Scope of the Internet of Things

The term Internet of Things (“IoT”), also sometimes called
the Internet of Everything, was first coined in 2005 and has since
been defined in many ways.6 The Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC” or the “Commission”) recently defined it as any device or
sensor that can “connect, communicate or transmit information
with or between each other through the Internet” excluding
“computers, smartphones, or tablets.”7 A contributing writer for
Forbes defined it more simply as “the concept of basically
connecting any device with an on and off switch to the Internet
(and/or to each other).”8 Further, Merriam-Webster places a
higher emphasis on the devices’ connectivity with each other,
defining it as “the networking capability that allows information
to be sent to and received from objects and devices (such as
fixtures and kitchen appliances) using the Internet.”9
Regardless of the precise definition, the number of IoT
devices is rapidly increasing, especially among consumers.10
In 2017, Gartner, Inc. predicted that the number of IoT devices in
use would rise from 8.4 billion to 20.4 billion by
2020.11 Furthermore, Gartner claimed that devices used by
consumers—as opposed to businesses—make up 63% of total
devices used.12 Additionally, Gartner estimated that consumers
6
FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 5 (2015).
7
Id. at 6.
8
Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things’, FORBES (May
13, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanationinternet-things-that-anyone-can-understand/#b55789b1d091.
9
Internet of Things, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/Internet%20of%20Things (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
10
Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Raising the
Standard: Bringing Security and Transparency to the Internet of Things?
(July 26, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
1395854/slaughter_-_raising_the_standard_-_bringing_security_and_transparency_
to_the_internet_of_things_7-26.pdf; see also Gartner Says 8.4 Billion Connected
“Things” Will Be in Use in 2017, Up 31 Percent From 2016, GARTNER (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2017-02-07-gartner-says-8billion-connected-things-will-be-in-use-in-2017-up-31-percent-from-2016 [hereinafter
Gartner] (finding that consumer application represented 63% of IoT applications
in 2017).
11
Gartner, supra note 10.
12
Id.
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and businesses would spend $2 trillion on IoT devices in 2017,13
and it predicts that number will rise to $3 trillion in
2020.14 These data demonstrate how much we already rely on
IoT devices, and they will only become a more integral part of
our lives.
B. Examples of IoT Devices
Several different categories of devices make up the IoT.
Common categories include health and fitness sensors, home
appliances, automobile sensors, and employee sensors.15 Each
type of sensor will be discussed in turn.
1.

Health and Fitness Sensors

Consumers and health care providers use health and fitness
sensors to track behavior, changes in health, and other
information such as vital signs. Categories of health and fitness
sensors include:
(1) countertop devices (such as a blood-pressure monitor or
weight scale); (2) wearable sensors (such as an arm or wrist
band); (3) intimate contact sensors (such as a patch or electronic
tattoo); (4) ingestible sensors (such as an electronic pill); and
(5) implantable sensors (such as a heart or blood health
monitor).16

Wearable sensors and implantable sensors are discussed in more
detail below.
Wearable devices are “devices that can be worn or mated
with human skin to continuously and closely monitor an
individual’s activities, without interrupting or limiting the user’s
motions.”17 Popular examples of these devices include the Fitbit

13

Id.
Id.
15
Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 98
(2014) (breaking down the internet of things into several categories, including
health and fitness sensors, automobile sensors, home and electricity sensors, and
employee sensors).
16
Id. at 98–99.
17
Mostafa Haghi et al., Wearable Devices in Medical Internet of Things:
Scientific Research and Commercially Available Devices, 23 HEALTHCARE
INFORMATICS RES. 4, 4–5 (2017).
14
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and the Apple Watch.18 Generally, users wear these devices on
their wrists to track several health indicators such as footsteps,
heart rate, sleeping patterns, calories burned, and more.19 The
devices can also analyze these data and provide advice to users
on ways to improve their health.20 In the past decade, wearable
devices have become increasingly popular.21 In fact, a 2016 study
showed that 17% of Americans over the age of 65 and 20% of
Americans under the age of 65 used wearable devices.22
Additionally, implantable sensors are an integral part of our
health care system.
One example of an important
internet-connected medical device is the pacemaker.23 The
implantable pacemaker monitors and assesses the performance
of a person’s heart and automatically transmits that data to a
doctor for review.24
Another example is the cardioverter
defibrillator, which detects abnormalities in a patient’s heartbeat
and automatically sends an electric shock to restart the heart if
needed.25 Like the pacemaker, the cardioverter defibrillator also
stores and transmits important heart-health data for a doctor’s
review.26 The importance of implantable connected devices that

18

FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/home (last visited Sept. 20, 2019); Apple
Watch Series 4, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/apple-watch-series-4/ (last visited
Aug. 15, 2019).
19
Our Technology, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/technology (last visited Sept.
20, 2019); Apple Watch Series 4 – Health & ECG, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/
apple-watch-series-4/health/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2019).
20
Our Technology, supra note 19; Apple Watch Series 4 – Health & ECG, supra
note 19.
21
See Haghi et al., supra note 17, at 4.
22
Bruce Japsen, Wearable Fitness Devices Attract More Than the Young and
Healthy, FORBES (July 11, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2016/07/
11/wearable-fitness-devices-attract-more-than-young-healthy/#244b67e957df.
23
Molika Ashford, First Internet-Connected
Pacemaker Successfully
Implanted, POPULAR SCI. (Aug. 11, 2009), https://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/
2009-08/first-patient-implanted-pacemaker-communicates-wirelessly-her-doctor.
The first internet-connected pacemaker was implanted in 2009. Id. The device
communicates with the doctor, so the doctor will be aware of any irregularities and
will be able to act quickly to remedy them. Id.
24
Id.
25
Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator, AM. HEART ASS’N, http://www.heart.
org/en/health-topics/arrhythmia/prevention--treatment-of-arrhythmia/implantablecardioverter-defibrillator-icd (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
26
Id.
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collect health data will only continue to grow.27
As this
technology becomes more commonplace, it will be crucial to
protect the sensitive data that these devices collect.
2.

Home Appliances

Internet-connected home appliances are also constantly
expanding in number.
Amazon Web Services has divided
internet-connected home devices into three categories: home
automation, home security and monitoring, and home
networking.28 The most popular examples of home appliance
devices in use today include Amazon’s Alexa, Samsung’s Family
Hub smart refrigerator, and the Nest Thermostat. Alexa, an
example of a home automation device, assists users by answering
questions, reporting the news, and playing music.29
Most
impressively, Alexa can control other appliances in the home via
internet connection, such as lightbulbs.30 Further, Samsung’s
smart refrigerator is also a home automation device.31 Through
an application, users can view the inside of the refrigerator on
the go to take note of its contents.32 The refrigerator can also
create shopping lists and display recipes.33 Next, the Nest
Learning Thermostat is a multifaceted device that uses
self-programming technology to monitor and change the
temperature of the home.34 It also acts as a home security
system by sending the consumer digital alerts if it detects smoke,
carbon monoxide, or extremely low temperatures that could
27
Cadie Thompson, The Future of Medicine Means Part Human, Part Computer,
CNBC (Dec. 24, 2013, 8:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2013/12/23/the-future-ofmedicine-means-part-human-part-computer.html (reporting that a top health
technology researcher expects that in a decade “one-third of the population will
have either a temporary device or another more permanent connected device in
their body”).
28
Connected Home – Internet of Things, AMAZON WEB SERVS.,
https://aws.amazon.com/iot/solutions/connected-home/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
29
See All Things Alexa: Alexa Features, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/b/
ref=gbpp_itr_m-2_5fb2_16067214?node=16067214011&ie=UTF8 (last visited Oct.
14, 2018).
30
Alexa Features: Using Multiple Devices with Alexa, AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/b/ref=aeg_lp_mdh_d/ref=s9_acss_bw_cg_aegflp_7c1_w?nod
e=17934691011&pf (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
31
See Family Hub, SAMSUNG, https://www.samsung.com/us/explore/family-hubrefrigerator/connected-hub/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Google Nest Learning Thermostat, GOOGLE, https://nest.com/thermostats/
nest-learning-thermostat/overview/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
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cause pipes to burst.35 Examples of the final category of home
appliance—home networking devices—include WiFi and Cable
TV boxes. These boxes can automatically send diagnostic reports
to customer service and allow consumers to monitor their
network connectivity through a mobile application.36 Experts at
Amazon anticipate the rate of growth of home appliances to be
18.5% annually.37 The experts expect an increase from 433
million shipped devices in 2016 to 940 million shipped devices in
2022.38
3.

Automobile Sensors

Two common types of automobile sensors are Event Data
Recorders (“EDRs”) and auto insurance telematics devices.39
EDRs are “devices[s] installed in . . . motor vehicle[s] to record
technical vehicle and occupant information for a brief period of
time (seconds, not minutes) before, during[,] and after a crash.”40
EDRs collect vehicle data to identify auto safety issues and
ultimately improve road safety.41 While vehicles are not required
to have EDRs, if a manufacturer voluntarily includes them,
federal regulations regulate what categories of data must be
collected.42 Even though EDRs are not mandatory, the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration estimated that 96% of
new vehicles have them because of the benefit they provide to
motor vehicle safety.43 Additionally, manufacturers can use the
data collected after vehicle accidents to improve the safety of the
cars.

35

Id.
Connected Home – Internet of Things, supra note 28.
37
Home of the Future: Building a Connected Home with AWS IoT, AMAZON
WEB SERVICES, https://d1.awsstatic.com/product-marketing/iot/AWS-IoT-ConnectedHome-Infographic.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
38
Id.
39
Peppet, supra note 15, at 104.
40
Event Data Recorder, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/research-data/event-data-recorder (last visited Sept. 1, 2019)
(“EDRs may record (1) pre-crash vehicle dynamics and system status, (2) driver
inputs, (3) vehicle crash signature, (4) restraint usage/deployment status, and
(5) post-crash data such as the activation of an automatic collision notification
(ACN) system.”).
41
Id.
42
See 49 C.F.R. § 563.3 (2019).
43
Peppet, supra note 15, at 104.
36
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Moreover, auto-insurance companies have begun using
internet-connected telematic devices, also called usage-based
insurance (“UBI”), to track how safely consumers drive.44 The
insurance companies then use the data collected to set insurance
premiums for consumers.45 The devices usually measure a
number of data points such as: “miles driven; time of day; where
the vehicle is driven (Global Positioning System or GPS); rapid
acceleration; hard braking; hard cornering; and air bag
deployment.”46 Progressive, a large auto insurance company,
uses a UBI device called Snapshot to determine insurance rates
based on how the customer drives.47 They boast that this
technology can save consumers an average of $130 on their
insurance premiums.48
4.

Employee Sensors

A final area of IoT devices is workplace sensors that monitor
an employee’s performance and activity.49 Commonly used IoT
devices in the workplace include sensors on package delivery
trucks, health and wellness apps, and devices that track
employee behavior.50 Examples of the latter category include a
performance monitor used by Bank of America and an activity
monitor called Biovigil.51 Bank of America used wearable sensors
developed by Ben Waber, president of Sociometric Solutions, on
call center employees to study why different call centers had
44
Sarwant Singh, The Future of Car Insurance: Digital, Predictive and
Usage-Based, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarwantsingh/
2017/02/24/the-future-of-car-insurance-digital-predictive-and-usage-based/#425849
3152fb.
45
Id.
46
Usage-Based Insurance and Telematics, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS,
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_usage_based_insurance.htm (last updated
May 17, 2019).
47
Snapshot,
PROGRESSIVE,
https://www.progressive.com/auto/discounts/
snapshot/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
48
Id.
49
Peppet, supra note 15, at 112.
50
Josh Bersin et al., Will IoT Technology Bring Us the Quantified Employee?:
The Internet of Things in Human Resources, DELOITTE (May 24, 2016),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/focus/internet-of-things/people-analyticsiot-human-resources.html#endnote-sup-11.
51
Vivian Giang, Companies Are Putting Sensors on Employees To
Track Their Every Move, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 14, 2013, 6:23 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/tracking-employees-with-productivity-sensors2013-3; BIOVIGIL, http://biovigil.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). It should be noted
that BioVigil was originally called HyGreen.
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different levels of employee productivity.52 The devices recorded
the employees’ tone of voice, speaking speed, and speaking
volume to determine the nature of people’s conversations and
stress levels.53 Based on the study, Bank of America concluded
that employees are more productive when they take breaks at the
same time and, thus, have time to socialize.54 Using this
information, Bank of America changed its break schedule and
increased employee productivity by 10%.55
Another example of connected employee monitoring devices
is the BioVigil hand hygiene system used in many healthcare
facilities.56 In hospitals that use the device, health care workers
wear badges that connect, via the internet, with hand-washing
sensors that detect when it is time for a hospital employee to
wash her hands.57 Then, the system records the event so that the
hospital can track and review its employees.58
Any time
healthcare workers should have washed their hands but did not,
the badge turns red to remind employees to do so.59 Biovigil
claims that its device has led to a reduction in medical staff
absenteeism by 18%.60 More importantly, Biovigil claims that it
has led to an 83% reduction in hospital-acquired infections.61
II. WHY REGULATION OF IOT DEVICES IS NECESSARY
The above descriptions of IoT devices demonstrate that these
devices have infiltrated almost every aspect of our daily lives.
And, because of the indispensable benefits they provide, it is
unlikely that we will discontinue their use. In fact, it is likely
that the number and potential uses of IoT devices will continue
to grow. Due to the increasing prevalence of these devices in our
lives, it is important to enact legislation that protects consumers
from the risks associated with large amounts of data collection
while still allowing for technological advancement. The more IoT
52

Giang, supra note 51.
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
BIOVIGIL, supra note 51.
57
BioVigil, BioVigil in Action, YOUTUBE (July 11, 2018), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=0EhEqKuHY8Q&feature=youtu.be.
58
BIOVIGIL, supra note 51.
59
BIOVIGIL, supra note 57.
60
BIOVIGIL, supra note 51
61
Id.
53
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devices used, the higher the risk of the misuse of data. The FTC
has split the risks associated with IoT devices into two
categories: security risks and privacy risks.62
A.

Security Risks

The primary security risks to consumers identified by
participants in an FTC workshop are: “(1) enabling unauthorized
access and misuse of personal information; (2) facilitating attacks
on other systems; and (3) creating [physical] safety risks.”63
1.

Unauthorized Access to Data and Attacks on Other Systems

The first two risks identified are closely aligned because they
concern hackers or other unauthorized third parties that may
take advantage of vulnerabilities in technology and the lack of
regulation to gain access to personal data stored on IoT devices.
Once accessed, hackers can then use personal data in
inappropriate ways or to attack other systems and devices.64
While these risks have been present for a long time in connection
with computers and mobile phones, the impact of the risks will
increase as the number of IoT devices increases.65
An example of an instance where hackers took advantage of
the vulnerabilities in technology is United States v. Vtech
Electronics Limited.66
There, the FTC sued Vtech, the
manufacturer of an electronic toy and corresponding application
called Kid Connect, for failing to comply with the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”).67 Vtech developed a
program in which parents could set up an account for their child
by providing the child’s name, date of birth, gender, and a profile

62

FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 10.
Id.
64
Id. at 11.
65
ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, Comments of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center to the Federal Trade Commission: On the Privacy and Security
Implications of the Internet of Things, at 16 (June 1, 2013) https://www.epic.org/apa/
comments/EPIC-FTC-IoT-Cmts.pdf [hereinafter EPIC] (“[M]any of the same data
security risks that currently threaten our data will only expand in the Internet of
Things.”); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 11 (“[A]s consumers install
more smart devices in their homes, they may increase the number of vulnerabilities
an intruder could use to compromise personal information.”).
66
Complaint at 1, United States v. Vtech Elecs. Ltd., No. 1:18-cv-114 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 8, 2018) [hereinafter Vtech Elecs.].
67
Id. at 1.
63

860

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:851

picture.68 Once registered, the children could use the chat
function to communicate with each other and even send pictures
and audio messages.69 In 2015, hackers were able to acces the
information of both the parents and the children even though it
had been encrypted because the database included the decryption
keys, so the hackers could view the data in a readable format.70
Due to the nature of the information collected, “if a child had
submitted a photo through Kid Connect, the hacker could have
found the photo, along with [the] physical address” of the
family.71
Another alarming example of hackers accessing IoT devices
is In the Matter of TRENDnet, Inc.72 There, the FTC sued
TRENDnet, the manufacturer of Internet Protocol cameras, for
violating the Federal Trade Commission Act (the “FTC Act”).73
The cameras allow consumers to monitor their homes or
businesses over the internet by accessing live video and audio
feeds.74 In 2012, hackers were able to access the live feeds and
obtain the IP addresses of hundreds of consumers.75 The hackers
then posted links to the live feeds of almost 700 cameras.76 The
feeds “displayed private areas of users’ homes and allowed the
unauthorized surveillance of infants sleeping in their cribs,
young children playing, and adults engaging in typical daily
activities.”77
68

Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
70
Id. at 8–9.
71
Id. at 9.
72
Complaint, In re TRENDnet, Inc., No. C-4426 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014), 2014 WL
556262. This matter was settled in 2014. See FTC Approves Final Order Settling
Charges Against TRENDnet, Inc., FTC (February 7, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2014/02/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-againsttrendnet-inc. TRENDnet is prohibited from misrepresenting the security of its
products. Id. It was also required to improve its secuirty program and notify
customers of the prior security issues. Id.
73
Id. at 1.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 3.
76
Id.
77
Id. It is important to note that TRENDnet is not the only video camera
company that has had these issues. Parents in Ohio, using a camera manufactured
by Foscam, woke up to “the sound of a man shouting, ‘Wake up, baby!’ ” from a man
who was watching their child sleep. Home, Hacked Home: The Perils of Connected
Devices, supra note 1. “The problem arose even though Foscam had taken all the
right steps in response to the initial breach, which shows how hard it is to protect
devices hooked up to the internet.” Id.
69
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Physical Safety Risks

Even more unsettling than the exposure of personal data are
the risks to a consumer’s physical safety. Physical safety risks
manifest in two ways. First, hackers can physically threaten
consumers by analyzing data from their devices to further the
commission of a crime. An example of this situation would be
where a hacker monitors a consumer’s IoT devices to determine
whether that person is home and then uses that data to commit a
burglary.78 Second, hackers can cause direct physical harm to
consumers by accessing and controlling their devices—for
example, where a person hacks into the telematic device of a
consumer’s car and takes control of the engine and brakes.79
One particularly disturbing possibility is a hacker accessing
a person’s IoT medical device to obstruct its beneficial purpose.
For example, Jerome Radcliffe, a researcher, demonstrated that
hackers could access insulin pumps to control the amount of
insulin distributed to diabetics.80 He explained that a hacker
could cause the device to display a higher blood sugar level than
actually exists, meaning that “[a] diabetic could be manipulated
into administering more insulin then [sic] needed, potentially
causing a hypoglycemic condition.”81 If it is possible for hackers
to access insulin pumps, it is easy to imagine that it would be
possible for hackers to access other medical devices, such as
pacemakers.82
B. Privacy Risks
When the FTC conducted a workshop on the IoT,
participants outlined several privacy risks associated with IoT
devices. These included the “collection of sensitive personal
78
EPIC, supra note 65, at 16–17; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at
13 (“[A] thief could remotely access data about energy usage from smart meters to
determine whether a homeowner is away from home.”).
79
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 12–13 (“Although the risks [of hacking
into cars] currently may be small, they could be amplified as fully automated cars,
and other automated physical objects, become more prevalent.”).
80
Jerome Radcliffe, Hacking Medical Devices for Fun and Insulin: Breaking the
Human SCADA System, at 1, https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-11/Radcliffe/BH_
US_11_Radcliffe_Hacking_Medical_Devices_WP.pdf.
81
Id.
82
Adrian Baranchuk et al., Cybersecurity for Cardiac Implantable Electronic
Devices: What Should You Know?, 71 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1284, 1284 (2018)
(discussing the “relatively new threat in light of recent incidents involving the
potential for hacking of cardiac devices”).
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information, such as precise geolocation, financial account
numbers, or health information.”83 These privacy risks are
further exacerbated by the fact that data collected across
numerous IoT devices for a single person could facilitate the
drawing of inferences about that person’s behavior patterns.84
1.

Collection of Sensitive Personal Information

The collection of sensitive personal information from smart
devices could reveal “information with potential for commercial
value.”85 If third parties have access to this kind of information,
it “could lead to the commercialization of intimate segments of
consumers’ lives.”86 For example, in FTC v. Vizio, Inc., the
Commission sued the television manufacturer Vizio under the
FTC Act for selling consumers’ data to third parties without
consent.87 Vizio collected “second-by-second information about
video displayed on the smart TV” and “append[ed] specific
demographic information to the viewing data, such as sex, age,
income, marital status, household size, education level, home
ownership, and household value.”88
Vizio then sold this
information to third parties for the purpose of measuring
audiences, analyzing advertisement effectiveness, and targeting
advertising to particular consumers.89
Smart TV manufacturers are not the only companies that
have sold consumer data to third parties.90 As a result, data
collection could lead to a greater power imbalance between

83

FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 14.
EPIC, supra note 65, at 10 (“One of the primary risks that internet users will
face as the Internet of Things expands is the fact that the ubiquitous collection and
storage of data about users can reveal sensitive behavior patterns.”).
85
Id. at 12 (“Smart devices could reveal a wealth of information about
consumers’ location, media consumption, activity patterns, associations, lifestyle,
age, income, gender, race and health . . . .”).
86
Id.
87
Complaint at 1, FTC v. Vizio, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00758 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2017)
[hereinafter Vizio Complaint].
88
FTC, Vizio to pay $2.2 Million to FTC, State of New Jersey To Settle Charges
It Collected Viewing Histories on 11 Million Smart Televisions Without Users’
Consent, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2017/02/vizio-pay-22-million-ftc-state-new-jersey-settle-charges-it
[hereinafter Vizio].
89
Vizio, supra note 88.
90
EPIC, supra note 65, at 12–13 (noting that General Motors, Verizon, and
Internet providers can or already have provided consumer data to third parties).
84
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consumers and corporations.91 The more information a company
has about consumers, the more power the company has over
them because they have an increased “ability to influence or
direct the behavior of consumers.”92 Examples of where this
might occur are insurance companies, like Progressive, that use
EDRs to determine insurance premiums based on driving
behavior, or rental car companies that use EDRs to “charge
numerous ‘gotcha fees’ for driving outside of specified regions or
using certain services.”93 As a result, companies that provide
important services leave consumers “relatively disempowered
and without meaningful choice.”94 For many important services,
such as phone service, consumers can choose from only a limited
number of companies, which provide long, form contracts that
are dictated by the companies.95 If consumers do not have a
meaningful choice to choose a service provider, they are
essentially forced to agree to the terms of a contract without the
ability to protect themselves from unwanted data collection.
2.

Behavioral Pattern Inferences

The immense volume of data collected across various IoT
devices allows those with access to that data to analyze it and
make inferences.96 One participant in the IoT workshop noted
that one data point is generated every six seconds in households
that use his company’s product, or 150 million data points daily
for 10,000 consumers collectively.97 These data points can
contain sensitive personal information, such as “precise
geolocation, financial account numbers, or health information.”98
However, the data points can also include “personal information,
habits, locations, and physical conditions over time.”99 Then,
91

Id. at 13.
Id. at 14 (“Information is power, and smart devices will provide much more
information about consumers’ behavior to companies than has been traditionally
available.”).
93
Id. at 15.
94
Id. at 13; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN
AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS
51 (2012) (“[A] ‘take it or leave it’ approach is problematic from a privacy
perspective, in markets for important services where consumers have few options.”).
95
EPIC, supra note 65, at 13.
96
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 15.
97
Id. at 14.
98
Id.
99
Id.
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864

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:851

these data points can be “used to infer a user’s mood; stress
levels; personality type; bipolar disorder; demographics (e.g.,
gender, marital status, job status, age); smoking habits; [and]
overall well-being.”100 These inferences could be used to “make
credit, insurance, and employment decisions.”101
An example of a device that could facilitate this amount of
data collection is the Smart Grid. The United States is currently
moving towards switching over utilities to a smart grid system.102
A smart grid “will be capable of monitoring everything from
power plants to customer preferences to individual appliances.”103
This technology has many indispensable benefits for the
economy, such as integrating alternative energy sources like
solar and wind power, enabling electric vehicles, allowing for
large-sale storage, and enabling the use of green buildings.104 At
the same time, this technology creates serious privacy risks
because “[i]nformation about a power consumer’s schedule can
reveal intimate, personal details about their lives, such as their
medical needs, interaction with others, and personal habits.”105
In order for such important technology to be successfully
integrated into our economy, we must first enact legislation to
protect the public from misuses of data.
III. CURRENT LEGISLATION AVAILABLE
Despite the growing privacy and security risks associated
with the IoT, there are currently no IoT-specific regulations on
the federal level. In fact, in 2013, the FTC conducted a workshop
where they stated that such legislation was not necessary at the
time.106 Since then, California has enacted two important pieces
100

Id. at 15.
Id.
102
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE SMART GRID: AN INTRODUCTION 2.
103
Id. at 13.
104
Id. at 15.
105
EPIC, supra note 65, at 11; see also ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY,
OPINION 04/2013 ON THE DATA PROTECTION IMPACT ASSESSMENT TEMPLATE FOR
SMART GRID AND SMART METERING SYSTEMS (‘DPIA TEMPLATE’) PREPARED BY
EXPERT GROUP 2 OF THE COMMISSION’S SMART GRID TASK FORCE 5 (2013)
[hereinafter DPIA TEMPLATE] (explaining that “[f]rom . . . the smart meters, a lot of
information can be inferred regarding the consumers’ use of specific goods or devices,
daily routines, living arrangements, activities, lifestyles and behaviour,” thus
creating risks of “price discrimination, profiling for behavioural advertisement,
taxation, law enforcement access, [and] household security”).
106
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 2–3, 48.
101
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of legislation that “represent a dramatic expansion of data
privacy law that will impact the products and processes of many
companies.”107 While the new California laws are not perfect to
fix all the issues with data privacy, they are a good starting point
that Congress should use as a model to enact federal level IoT
legislation.
A.

FTC Recommendation

After conducting a workshop on the IoT in 2013, the FTC
published its recommendation on how to improve IoT security in
2015.108 At the workshop, the FTC consulted the advice and
opinions of many participants who noted the various security and
privacy risks associated with the IoT.
1.

Description of the Provisions

Most notably, the FTC noted that the “[s]taff does not believe
that the privacy and security risks, though real, need to be
addressed through IoT-specific legislation at this time.”109 The
Commission reasoned that “legislation aimed specifically at the
IoT at this stage would be premature” because of the “great
potential for innovation.”110
Instead, the Commission
recommended that companies take a self-regulatory approach
and adopt best practices concerning “data security, data
minimization, and notice and choice.”111
Additionally, the
Commission urged Congress to “enact strong, flexible, and
technology-neutral legislation to strengthen the Commission’s
existing data security enforcement tools and require companies
to notify consumers when there is a security breach.”112
In the meantime, the Commission stated that it will rely on
existing laws to hold IoT companies liable for any harm to
consumers.113 These laws include the FTC Act, the Fair Credit
107

New California Security of Connected Devices Law and CCPA Amendments,
GIBSON DUNN (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/new-california-securityof-connected-devices-law-and-ccpa-amendments/. In 2018, California passed the
California Consumer Privacy Act and a new law that specifically regulates internet
connected devices. Id. Both laws went into effect on January 1, 2020. Id.
108
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 48–53.
109
Id. at 48.
110
Id. at 49.
111
Id. at 27.
112
Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
113
Id. at 53.
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Reporting Act (“FCRA”), COPPA, and “the health breach
notification provisions” of the Health Information Technology for
Economic Clinical Health Act (“HI-TECH Act”).114
The
Commission also stated that it will educate consumers and
businesses on how to protect themselves, work with groups to
consider “guidelines related to the Internet of Things,” and
advocate for courts and other agencies to “promote protections in
this area.”115
2.

Issues with the FTC Recommendation

Even though the FTC determined in 2015 that enacting IoTspecific legislation was too premature—given the growing
number IoT devices and the growing number of data breaches
and harms to consumers—it is no longer premature to enact this
kind of legislation. In 2018, the Identity Theft Resource Center
published a study showing that the total number of data
breaches has doubled since 2015.116 The main problem with the
FTC’s recommendation for IoT security is that the existing laws
that it plans to rely on protect consumers only to a limited
extent.117 An IoT specific law is needed to address the gaps in the
FTC Act, FCRA, COPPA, and the HI-TECH Act.
a.

FTC Act

Specifically, the FTC recommends relying on § 5 of the FTC
Act for “[u]nfair methods of competition.”118 This section declares
that the “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce” are unlawful.119 Additionally, the Act only permits
the FTC to bring an action against “persons, partnerships, or
corporations” that are in violation of the Act.120 Private citizens
have no right to bring a claim, meaning that consumers must

114

Id.
Id.
116
See ITRC Data Breach Overview 2005 to 2017, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE
CTR. (2018), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/Overview20052017.pdf
(showing that the number of data breaches in 2015 was 780, while the number of
data breaches in 2017 was 1,579).
117
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 53.
118
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018).
119
Id.
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Id. § (a)(2).
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rely on the “FTC’s willingness to act.”121 The primary issue with
relying on the FTC Act for IoT-related security issues is that it
does not afford consumers a private right of action. Furthermore,
it fails to protect consumers against situations in which a party
did not act unfairly or deceptively, yet the consumer is still
injured. For example, if a manufacturer is merely negligent in
its privacy protocols and a consumer is injured, the consumer
would not have a private right of action against the
manufacturer.
It may be argued that while there is not a private right of
action in the FTC Act, every state has enacted its own Unfair and
Deceptive Acts and Practices statute (“UDAP”) which provides
consumers with a private right of action.122 While this is true,
these statutes vary widely in terms of their strength.123 For
example, a few states have civil penalty maximums of $1,000,
while others have civil penalty maximums as high as $50,000.124
Furthermore, states vary in the scope of their coverage.125 While
some states offer strong protections for credit and insurance
issues, other states provide relatively weak protections.126 Given
the fact that IoT-related privacy and security risks tend to span
across states, it would be more efficient if consumers could bring
claims in federal court, under a uniform law where they could
receive similar remedies for similar injuries.
b.

FCRA

Even though the FTC has yet to bring an IoT claim under
the FCRA, the Commission still recommends its use to protect
against IoT security and privacy risks. However, the FCRA is
insufficient for this purpose because it is limited in scope and
would apply to few IoT-related cases. The purpose of the FCRA
121
Id.; see also Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions
Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade
Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 523 (1980).
122
Unfair & Deceptive Acts & Practices, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR.,
https://www.nclc.org/issues/unfair-a-deceptive-acts-a-practices.html (last visited
Sept. 21, 2019).
123
CAROLYN CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN
THE STATES: A 50-STATE EVALUATION OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES LAWS 9
(2018).
124
Id. at 2.
125
See id. at 5-8.
126
Id. at 5 (showing that Alabama offers strong credit and insurance protections
and that Arizona offers weak credit and insurance protections).
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is “to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable
procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer
credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner
which is fair and equitable.”127 One application of this Act is to
“third-party consumer reports used for credit or employment
purposes.”128 Generally, this Act does not apply to the parties
that first collect the data.129 In other words, the Act would not
“cover IoT device manufacturers that do their own in-house
analytics” or “companies that collect data directly from
consumers’ connected devices and use the data to make in-house
credit, insurance, or other eligibility decisions.”130 For example,
car insurance companies, like Progressive, could use UBI devices
to collect data about consumers, and use that data to make
insurance decisions without risk of violating FCRA.131
c.

COPPA

COPPA is similar to the FTC Act in that it “prohibits unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in connection with the collection,
use, and/or disclosure of personal information from and about
children on the Internet.”132 Some notable differences are that
COPPA applies only to children under the age of thirteen133 and
states that any collection of a child’s personal information
requires parental consent.134 The most important difference is
that COPPA requires companies that collect personal
information from children to “maintain reasonable procedures to
protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity” of the
information.135
For example, in the Vtech case, the Commission used COPPA
to hold a toy manufacturer liable when hackers were able
to access children’s information.136 One of the counts of the
127

15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2018).
Katherine Britton, IoT Big Data: Consumer Wearables, Data Privacy and
Security, AM. B. ASS’N. (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/
landslide/2015-16/november-december/IoT-Big-Data-Consumer-Wearables-DataPrivacy-Security/.
129
Id.
130
Id.
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Snapshot, supra note 47.
132
FTC Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.1 (2013).
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§ 312.2.
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§ 312.5(a).
135
§ 312.8.
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See Vtech Elecs., supra note 66, at 1–2, 9–10.
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complaint alleged that the company violated the Act because of
its failure to maintain reasonable security measures to protect
the children’s information.137 While COPPA is limited because it
only applies to information of children under the age of thirteen,
a provision requiring reasonable security measures for people of
all ages would better help to protect consumers than the
currently available federal laws.
d.

HI-TECH Act

Finally, the FTC recommends reliance on the health breach
notification portion of the HI-TECH Act. This section of the
HI-TECH Act provides that entities that keep consumers’ health
information should “notify each individual whose unsecured
protected health information has been, or is reasonably believed
by the covered entity to have been, accessed, acquired, or
disclosed as a result” of breach of such information.138 Data
breach notification laws of this kind generally serve two
purposes: to “recognize that an individual has a ‘right to know’
about unauthorized misuse of his or her personal information
and notice of the incident enables mitigation of subsequent
identity theft”; and to “encourage organizations to adopt better
security practices” because of the negative reputational effects of
reporting a data breach.139
While this law is helpful in
encouraging companies to increase security measures, it is not
enough to remedy IoT security issues because it is primarily a
retroactive provision that does not actually prevent data
breaches in the first place.140 Furthermore, it only applies to
health data, so it does not provide a remedy for another kind of
data breach.

137

Id. at 10.
42 U.S.C. § 17932(a) (2018).
139
Mark Burdon, Contextualizing the Tensions and Weaknesses of Information
Privacy and Data Breach Notification Laws, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 63, 78–79 (2011).
140
Id. at 126 (“[Data breach notification] laws should not be viewed as a ‘be all
end all’ solution to problems relating to the inadequate protection of personal
information by corporations. Data breach notification laws are extremely useful at
highlighting problems but that does not mean they necessarily have the regulatory
tools to remedy the problems that they uncover.”).
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B. California Consumer Privacy Act and Connected Devices Bill
The California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) was
approved by the Governor on June 28, 2018, and went into effect
on January 1, 2020.141 The bill was passed in part as a response
to the Cambridge Analytica scandal in which millions of people’s
personal information was misused.142 The scandal, along with
the increase in personal consumer data,143 caused the California
legislature to realize that it has “not kept pace with” the
developments in the collection of personal information.144 The
aim of the bill is to further the right to privacy by “giving
consumers an effective way to control their personal
information.”145 While the CCPA and the Connected Devices Act,
discussed below, are not perfect, they are a model that Congress
could look to in crafting specific IoT regulations.
1.

Provisions of the CCPA

The CCPA grants consumers the following rights: (1) “to
know what personal information is being collected”; (2) “to know
whether their personal information is sold or disclosed and to
whom”; (3) “to say no to the sale of personal information”; (4) “to
access their personal information”; and (5) “to equal service and
price, even if they exercise their privacy rights” under this Act.146
The CCPA defines personal information as “information that
identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated
with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a
particular consumer or household.”147 It applies to any business
that meets one of the following characteristics: (1) “[h]as annual
gross revenues in excess of twenty-five million dollars”;
(2) receives “the personal information of 50,000 or more
consumers”; or (3) “[d]erives 50 percent or more of its annual

141

Assemb. B. 375, Ch. 55, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
§ 2(g).
143
§ 2(c) (“It is almost impossible to apply for a job, raise a child, drive a car, or
make an appointment without sharing personal information.”).
144
§ 2(d). “The unauthorized disclosure of personal information and the loss of
privacy can have devasting effects for individuals . . . .” § 2(f).
145
§ 2(i).
146
Id.
147
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West, Westlaw current through urgency
legis. through Ch. 40 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.) (effective Jan. 1, 2020).
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revenues from selling” personal information.148 Additionally, the
CCPA does not apply to “personal information if every aspect of
that commercial conduct takes place wholly outside of
California.”149
For the most part, the CCPA does not provide a private right
of action. Instead, most violations can be pursued only by the
attorney general.150 However, there is one exception where a
consumer has a “private right of action in connection
with . . . a consumer’s nonencrypted or nonredacted personal
information.”151 Notably, the law does not restrict businesses in
regard to “information that is deidentified or in the aggregate
consumer information.”152
2.

Provisions of the Connected Devices Act

On September 28, 2018, the California Governor approved of
the Connected Devices Act that took effect on January 1, 2020.153
The Connected Devices Act goes one step further than the CCPA
and provides that a manufacturer of a device that connects to the
internet should be equipped “with a reasonable security feature”
that protects “any information contained therein from
unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or
disclosure.”154 Similar to the CCPA, this law does not provide
consumers with a private right of action.155 Notably, the bill does
148
Id. § 1798.140(c)(1)(A)–(C); see also Eric Goldman, An Introduction to the
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) 2, (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies
Research Paper, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3211013
(“The IAPP conservatively estimated that over a half-million businesses are
regulated by the law, ‘the vast majority of which are small- to medium-sized
enterprises.’ ”).
149
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(a)(6) (effective Jan. 1, 2020) (“[C]ommercial
conduct takes place wholly outside of California if the business collected that
information while the consumer was outside of California, no part of the sale of the
consumer’s personal information occurred in California, and no personal information
collected while the consumer was in California is sold.”).
150
Assemb. B. 375, Ch. 55, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
151
Id.
152
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(a)(5). “ ‘Deidentified’ means information that
cannot reasonably identify . . . a particular consumer . . . .” § 1798.140(h).
“ ‘Aggregate consumer information’ means information that relates to a group or
category of consumers, from which individual consumer identities have been
removed . . . .” § 1798.140(a).
153
S.B. 327, Ch. 886, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
154
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.91.04(a)(3) (West, Westlaw current with urgency
legis. through Ch. 40 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.) (effective Jan. 1, 2020).
155
§ 1798.91.06(e).
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not provide a specific definition for “reasonable” security
measures. However, the Connected Devices Act does specify that
the reasonable security provision will be met “if a connected
device is equipped with a means for authentication outside a
local area network . . . if either of the following requirements are
met: (1) The preprogrammed password is unique to each device
manufactured”; or “(2) The device contains a security feature that
requires a user to generate a new means of authentication before
access is granted to the device for the first time.”156
3.

Issues with CCPA and the Connected Devices Act

Taken together, the CCPA and the Connected Devices Act
take important steps to further the protection of consumers
against the security and privacy risks associated with the IoT. In
crafting a federal-level statute, these acts could be models for
Congress with regard to the reasonable security feature
provision, and in some reliance on notice and consent. However,
there are three main issues with these California statutes that
should be addressed: (1) the CCPA does not apply to
de-identified data; (2) the CCPA places too much emphasis on the
role of the consumer and on notice and consent by the
manufacturer; and (3) neither the CCPA nor the Connected
Devices Act provides a private right of action for the consumer.
a.

De-identification

The CCPA expressly does not extend to information that has
been de-identified.157 De-identified data refer to data in which
“all explicit identifiers” have been removed, “such as name,
address, and phone number,” so that the data collected cannot be
identified and attributed to a specific person.158 The issue with
excluding de-identified data from protection is that the excluded
data are fairly easy to re-identify with only a few specific data
points.159
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§ 1798.145(a)(5).
158
Latayna Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely 2
(Carnegie Mellon Univ., Data Privacy Working Paper No. 3, 2000),
https://dataprivacylab.org/projects/identifiability/paper1.pdf.
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Numerous studies have emerged showing how easily data
can be re-identified. For example, in an important study by
Latayna Sweeney in 2000, Sweeney discovered that 87% of the
United States population could be identified by zip code, gender,
and birth date alone.160 Sweeney was even able to track down the
Massachusetts Governor’s hospital records with these data points
and mailed them to him as proof of her theory.161 Furthermore,
in 2006, AOL released the internet search histories of 657,000
Americans after removing identifying information.162 However, it
was quickly realized that individuals could be re-identified.163
Bloggers were able to track down, among others, Thelma Arnold
of Georgia based on her internet searches for landscapers, dog
training tips, single men, and other queries.164 Similar to the
AOL scandal, in 2006 Netflix “released one hundred million
records revealing how nearly a half-million of its users had rated
movies” as part of a contest.165 Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly
Shmatikov used this Netflix data to show how easy it is to
re-identify data.166 They were able to show that 64% of users
could be re-identified by knowing two of their movie ratings and
the dates that they were rated.167
b.

Notice and Consent

The CCPA’s reliance on notice and consent is too heavy
because it requires the consumer to learn about the privacy
policies of the manufacturer and then take action if the policies
are unsatisfactory.168 Notice and consent provisions can be
important because they give consumers the opportunity to make
informed decisions, particularly in situations concerning
160

Sweeney, supra note 158.
Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure
of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1719–20 (2010).
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Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No.
4417749, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/
technology/09aol.html; see also Ohm, supra note 161, at 1717 (explaining that AOL
“suppressed any obviously identifying information such as AOL username and IP
address” and “replaced these identifiers with unique identification numbers”).
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Barbaro & Zeller, Jr., supra note 162.
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Id.
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Ohm, supra note 161, at 1720.
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ARVIND NARAYANAN & VITALY SHMATIKOV, THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN,
HOW TO BREAK ANONYMITY OF THE NETFLIX PRIZE DATASET 1 (2018).
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Id. at 2.
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It should be noted that the FTC report also suggests that the companies
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sensitive information.169 But, while these provisions are a
necessary component of consumer protection, they alone are not
sufficient because they place too much emphasis on the actions of
consumers rather than focus on preventing data breaches in the
first place.
A major problem with notice and consent provisions is that a
majority of consumers do not read them.
In one study,
researchers set up a fake social media website and participants
were asked to register an account.170 In the process, participants
were asked to agree to the terms and conditions.171 Researchers
measured the amount of time users spent reading the policy and
included two “gotcha clauses” to determine whether the
participants actually read the policy.172 The first “gotcha clause”
stated that the company website could transfer any information
to third-parties.173 The second “gotcha clause” stated that “by
agreeing . . . participants would give up their first-born child.”174
The results showed that 96% of participants spent less than five
minutes reading the policy, even though it was estimated to take
half an hour.175 Additionally, 93% of participants agreed to the
“gotcha clauses,” allowing the transfer of their information to
third parties and giving up their first born child.176 This study
169

Id.
Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet:
Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking
Services 6 (TPRC 44: The 44th Research Conference on Communication, Information
& Internet Policy, 2016, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2757465.
171
Id. at 2.
172
Id. at 11–12.
173
Id. at 11.
174
Id. at 12.
175
Id. at 16. For many popular apps and websites, reading the terms and
conditions would take multiple hours, and, therefore, it would be unreasonable to
expect consumers to read them. For example, it took one man eight hours and
fifty-nine minutes to read the terms of use on Amazon. Johnny Lieu, Terms and
Conditions Are Too long, Just Ask a Guy Who Read Amazon’s for 9 Hours,
MASHABLE (Mar. 15, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/03/15/reading-amazonsterms-conditions/#kabwyEF28Oq1. The Washington Post published a study showing
that it takes 193 minutes to read the iTunes terms and conditions, 95 minutes to
read the Candy Crush terms and conditions, and 117 minutes for LinkedIn’s. Rick
Noack, How Long Would It Take To Read the Terms of Your Smartphone Apps?
These
Norwegians
Tried
It
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WASH.
POST
(May
28,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/05/28/how-long-would-ittake-to-read-the-terms-of-your-smartphone-apps-these-norwegians-tried-itout/?utm_term=.ad8ebfceaeba.
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illustrates that even though notice and consent provisions seem
like a good idea, they are ineffective because consumers do not
generally take advantage of the protections they provide.
Because of the consumer apathy in this area, more emphasis
should be placed on the actions of the manufacturers, rather than
the actions of consumers to protect their privacy.
c.

Lack of A Private Right of Action

The final issue with the CCPA and the Connected Devices
Act is that neither one provides a private right of action for
consumers.177 Without a private right of action, consumers must
rely on the government to address the wrongs committed by IoT
manufacturers. Additionally, any remedy ordered by the court
would not always be paid directly to the consumer. For example,
in some of the cases described above, where consumers did not
have a private right of action, they barely received any remedy
for the breach of their sensitive information. In In the matter of
TRENDnet, where hackers accessed home security cameras, the
only remedy offered to consumers was that the company had to
notify any affected customers and aid them in disabling the
cameras.178 Likewise, in Vizio and VTech, the parties sought
monetary judgments, but those judgments were to be paid out to
government agencies rather than consumers.179
As with TRENDnet, Vizio, and Vtech, any claim brought
under the CCPA is not likely to directly compensate the
consumer. Under the CCPA, any monetary judgment is to be
paid to a “[c]onsumer [p]rivacy [f]und” and the money in the fund
“shall be used exclusively to offset any costs incurred by the state
courts and the Attorney General in connection with this title.”180

177
Assemb. B. 375, Ch. 55, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). It should be noted
that the FTC Act also does not provide a private right of action. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)
(West, Westlaw current through P.L. 116-29).
178
Complaint at 9–10, In re Trendnet, Inc., No. C-4426 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014),
2014 WL 556262.
179
Vizio Complaint, supra note 87, at 4; Vtech Electronics, supra note 66, at 12.
180
CAL CIV. CODE § 1798.160 (West, Westlaw current with urgency legis.
through Ch. 40 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.) (effective Jan. 1, 2020).
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IV. RECOMMENDATION
As it currently stands, there is no federal, IoT-specific
regulation that adequately aims to protect consumers from the
unique risks that IoT devices create. IoT-specific legislation is
needed because these “devices may be inherently vulnerable” to
privacy and security risks.181 The sheer amount of data being
collected, and the rapid growth of these devices creates risks that
must be preemptively addressed to better protect consumers. In
2012, the White House published a report on ways to promote
consumer data protection.182 The report promoted a “Consumer
Privacy Bill of Rights” to advance the following objectives:
“[i]ndividual [c]ontrol,” “[t]ransparency,” “[r]espect for [c]ontext,”
“[s]ecurity,” “[a]ccess and [a]ccuracy,” “[f]ocused [c]ollection,” and
“[a]ccountability.”183 The recommendation proscribed by this
Note for consumer protection will also attempt to further those
same objectives.
While no single regulation available is enough on its own to
sufficiently protect consumers, some of the laws described above
contain types of provisions that could be effective in an
IoT-specific law if they are combined into one regulation. These
include: (1) making the manufacturer responsible for installing
reasonable security measures into the devices; (2) notice of and
consent to the collection, use, and sale of personal data; (3) data
breach notification laws; and (4) a private right of action.
Additionally, one type of provision that is missing from these
regulations that would be wise to include in a new IoT-specific
regulation is use-constraints, or constraints on the way
manufacturers use and store data.

181
Peppet, supra note 15, at 135 (“[T]hese products are often manufactured by
traditional consumer-goods makers rather than computer hardware or software
firms. The engineers involved may therefore be relatively inexperienced with
data-security issues, and the firms involved may place insufficient priority on
security concerns.”).
182
See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A
NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING
INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY (2012).
183
Id. at 1.
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A Federal Regulation Should Combine the Following in an
IOT-Specific Law: Reasonable Security Measures, Notice and
Consent, Data Breach Notification, and a Private Right of
Action

Requiring companies to place reasonable security measures
on IoT devices is important for two reasons. First, it would
prevent the misuse of personal data by manufacturers and
unauthorized third parties. Second, unlike notice and consent
provisions,184 it places the burden of consumer protection on the
companies who may not otherwise take the extra time and effort
to do so.185 While the FTC and the White House maintain that
the § 5 of the FTC Act requires IoT devices to maintain
reasonable security measures,186 as discussed above, the FTC Act
is insufficient on its own to protect consumers because it is
limited in scope and does not provide a private right of action.187
Creating a provision that specifically states that manufacturers
of IoT devices must provide reasonable security measures to
protect consumers’ data, like COPPA and the California
Connected Devices Act, would promote both security interests
and accountability, as recommended by the White House.188
While the Connected Devices Act does not define what
“reasonable security measures” means, the California
Department of Justice published a Data Breach report in 2016
that provided recommendations for technology companies on how
to provide reasonable security measures.189
Some of the
184
Because consumers are unlikely to pay close attention to notice and comment
provisions, more emphasis should be placed on the actions of the manufacturers
rather than relying on the actions of consumers to protect their own privacy. See
supra Section III.B.3.b.
185
See supra Section III.B.2.
186
THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 182, at 29 (“Enforcement actions by the
FTC . . . have established that companies’ failures to adhere to voluntary privacy
commitments, such as those stated in privacy policies, are actionable under the FTC
Act’s . . . prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N,
supra note 94, at 29 (arguing that the FTC Act provides that companies must
implement reasonable security measures).
187
See supra Section III.A.2.a.
188
See supra Section III.B.2.; THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 182, at 19, 21
(“SECURITY: Consumers have a right to secure and responsible handling of
personal data . . . . ACCOUNTABILITY: Consumers have a right to have personal
data handled by companies with appropriate measures in place to assure they
adhere to the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.”).
189
KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA DATA BREACH
REPORT 27–38 (2016).
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recommendations the report proposes include: (1) a stronger
authentication process for consumers to access devices that
contain sensitive personal information, stronger than just a
username and password combination; and (2) encrypting
consumers’ personal information.190
Furthermore, notice and consent may promote the control
and transparency objectives set out by the White House’s
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights. Notice and consent are
important because they offer consumers the option to be in
control of their own information,191 and these provisions can also
provide consumers with access to information so they can better
understand what their data is being used for.192 However, as
discussed earlier, notice and consent are inefficient on their own
because consumers rarely take the time to read privacy policy
statements. Moreover, with regard to essential services, like
phone services, consumers may not really have a meaningful
choice since the privacy policies across phone companies tend to
be similar.193 Therefore, notice and consent must be paired with
other protections to be effective in protecting consumers.
Additionally, data breach notification laws provide
consumers with control and transparency because such laws give
consumers an opportunity to take steps to protect themselves.
For example, if credit card information is breached, a consumer
could take steps to immediately cancel the card and order a new
one before significant financial harm is inflicted. Finally, a
private right of action may permit consumers to hold companies
accountable for failure to comply with IoT regulations without
having to rely on the government to bring an action.194
B. Use Constraints
One area where the current legislation is lacking is in
putting use constraints on IoT manufacturers. Use constraints
limit how manufacturers use and store sensitive data collected
about consumers. These constraints could address the final three
190

Id. at v–vi.
THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 182, at 11 (“Individual Control: Consumers
have a right to exercise control over what personal data companies collect from them
and how they use it.”).
192
Id. at 14 (“TRANSPARENCY: Consumers have a right to easily
understandable and accessible information about privacy and security practices.”).
193
See supra Section III.B.3.b.
194
See supra Section III.B.3.c.
191
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objectives set out by the White House: respect for context, access
and accuracy, and focused collection.195 In a report by the FTC in
2012, the Commission explained some types of use constraints
that could be applied to data privacy protection, including
limiting the type of data collected, disposing of any data collected
after a certain time period, and ensuring that the data collected
about a consumer is accurate.196
If companies were to limit the type of data being collected to
only data that is necessary to accomplish a goal that is
reasonably related to the consumer’s use of the device, then it
would serve both the “respect for context” and “focused collection”
objectives.197 This limitation would also allow consumers to be
more aware of what information is being collected since it would
be information that consumers would reasonably expect to be
collected.198 Additionally, limits on data collection could prevent
discrimination based on harmful inferences that can be made
from certain types of data.199 In its 2012 privacy report, the FTC
provided an example of a company successfully limiting its data
collection to that which is necessary. Takers of the Graduate
Management Admission Test (“GMAT”) became concerned about
providing fingerprints to gain admission to the test because of
the potential that they may be “cross-referenced against criminal
databases.”200 GMAT responded to the concern by using palm
prints to identify test-takers, rather than fingerprints.201 Palm
prints are just as accurate as fingerprinting at identifying
individuals, but they are less commonly used as identifiers, so
there is less risk that they can be used as a cross reference in a
criminal database.202

195

THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 182, at 1.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 94, at vii.
197
THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 182, at 15 (“RESPECT FOR CONTEXT:
Consumers have a right to expect that companies will collect, use, and disclose
personal data in ways that are consistent with the context in which consumers
provide the data.”); id. at 21 (“FOCUSED COLLECTION: Consumers have a right to
reasonable limits on the personal data that companies collect and retain.”).
198
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 94, at 37.
199
Peppet, supra note 15, at 90 (explaining that large amounts of data collection
“are the grist for drawing revealing and often unexpected inferences about our
habits, predilections, and personalities,” which can lead to discrimination).
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FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 94, at 27.
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Id.
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Id. (noting that the counsel for the GMAT test “received a privacy innovation
award for small businesses for its work in this area”).
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Furthermore, requiring that companies dispose of data after
a reasonable period of time serves the White House’s objective of
respect for context and security.203
What qualifies as a
reasonable amount of time would depend on the nature of the
device and its expected use. Disposal of data not only helps
maintain the most recent, accurate consumer data but also
significantly decreases the amount of data left vulnerable to
misuse by unauthorized third parties.
Finally, ensuring that data are accurate serves the White
House’s objectives of access and accuracy.204 Inaccurate data
could lead to incorrect inferences about a consumer, which in
turn could harm consumers in matters of employment, insurance
coverage, and more.205 As discussed above, the FCRA imposes
accuracy requirements on companies, but it is limited in scope
and does not apply to many IoT devices.206 The FTC notes that
data used for different purposes could have different standards
for accuracy. For example, “[c]ompanies using data to make
decisions about consumers’ eligibility for benefits should take
much more robust measures to ensure accuracy” than “companies
using data for marketing purposes.”207 Therefore, an IoT-specific
regulation could require different standards for accuracy based
on the sensitivity of the type of data collected or the vulnerability
of the consumer concerning specific kinds of technology.
CONCLUSION
IoT devices are an ever-increasing force of nature in our
daily lives. They provide a multitude of essential benefits that
we as a society have come to rely on. Thus, IoT devices are likely
to continue to become irreplaceable tools. With the many
benefits that these devices bring, they also bring a vast array of
privacy and security issues that our society has not had to face
until recently. Because of the new and prevalent risks associated
203

See supra notes 191, 200.
THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 182, at 19 (“ACCESS AND ACCURACY:
Consumers have a right to access and correct personal data in usable formats, in a
manner that is appropriate to the sensitivity of the data and the risk of adverse
consequence to consumers if the data is inaccurate.”).
205
See supra Section II.B.2. For example, inaccurate information collected by
usage-based insurance devices could cause consumers to pay more in insurance
premiums. See supra Section I.B.3.
206
See supra Section III.A.2.b.
207
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 94, at 30.
204
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with the IoT and because of the increasing harms to consumers,
it is time for Congress to enact an IoT-specific data privacy and
security law. Some of the provisions that Congress should
consider including in such a law are reasonable security
measures, notice and consent, data breach notification, a private
right of action, and constraints on the way that manufacturers
use and store consumer data.

